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PRINCIPAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION AND PATENT
POLICY: AN INHERENT CONFLICT WHICH REQUIRES
DENIAL OF REGISTRATION TO CONTAINER DESIGNS
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff in Sears v. Stiffel Co.' sought to enjoin defendant's
simulation of his pole lamp, alleging that this copying constituted both
infringement of his design patent and unfair competition. The lower
court, although holding the design patent invalid, enjoined defendant's
copying, reasoning that there was a likelihood of confusion as to the source
of the product, and that hence, the copying constituted unfair competi-
tion which could be enjoined under state law.2 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that copying of an unpatented
article could not be enjoined through application of a state's unfair com-
petition laws, because federal patent policy establishes that the public
has the right to freely copy any unpatented article, since such articles are
part of the public domain. The doctrine of pre-emption mandated that
state unfair competition law could not withhold from the public some-
thing which is within its domain under applicable federal law.3
The Sears case, standing alone, was limited in breadth because of
two qualifications announced by the Court. First, it was said that a state
could nevertheless require product sources to be readily identifiable through
clear labeling. Second, a state could still protect businesses in the use
of their trademarks or distinctive packages in order to prevent misleading
product source identification. 4 Thus, it appeared that Sears would pre-
empt state unfair competition law only when it clashed with the objectives
of federal patent law.5 However, this interpretation of Sears becomes
somewhat uncertain when it is related to the companion case of Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,6 in which it was again held that copy-
ing of an unpatented design could not be enjoined by state law. In
Compco there were express findings that the design of plaintiff Day
Brite's reflector identified that company to the trade and that defendant
had followed the design closely enough to raise the likelihood of confusion
as to product source.7 Despite these facts, however, the Court concluded
that, absent patent or other federal statutory protection, federal policy
permitted copying "in every detail by whoever [sic] pleases," even though
1. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1962).
3. 376 U.S. at 232. A contrary result would allow states to permit perpetual
protection from copying to articles not entitled to patent protection; whereas, articles
entitled to such protection would be immune from copying for only fourteen or seven-
teen years.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 231.
6. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
7. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962).
8. 376 U.S. at 238.
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the design might be: (1) distinctive; (2) non-functional;9 (3) arbitrary;1"
(4) possessive of secondary meaning;" and (5) even though the copy
results in confusion as to the source of the product.' 2 The thrust of the
Court's opinion was that patent law protection from copying could not
be extended beyond its limited duration because such an extension would
be contrary to the patent law policy of allowing free copying of un-
patented articles.
The Court attempted to limit the scope of Compco by intimating that
copying of unpatented designs might be enjoined where such an injunc-
tion was based upon "other federal statutory protection."' 3 Under the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,14 an injunction can issue when a Prin-
cipal Register trademark 5 is copied. 16 Registration on the Principal
9. A design is non-functional if it is not essential to the use of the containeror article and not necessary for successful operation of the product. For example, if
it is simply ornamental or serves merely as a badge or identifying mark, it will be
considered non-functional. See, e.g., J.C. Penny Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co.,
120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Lektro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92 F.2d
435 (2d Cir. 1937); Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 648 (1935), aff'd on rehearing, 109 F.2d 566 (2d
Cir. 1940).
10. A feature or design is arbitrary if its existence is not essential to the product's
use or if it has no functional value. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R.
Moslen & Co., 233 F. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
11. A design, symbol or feature is deemed to have acquired secondary meaningif it has, by sufficiently long and exclusive use, become associated in the minds of
purchasers with the source or origin of the goods. If the feature identifies the pro-
ducer to the trade and if it is broadly known to the public as denoting a product ofcertain origin, it has acquired secondary meaning. See Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1067,
1079-82 (1944).
12. 376 U.S. at 238. The Court stated that these factors might be relevant in
applying state labeling law but that they could not furnish a basis for prohibiting
copying. In support of this proposition the Court relied upon Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), but that case would seem to be weak support forsuch a conclusion, since: (1) the plaintiff in Kellogg had failed to show that secondary
meaning had attached; and (2) the Court took great pains to distinguish its position
from one in which secondary meaning had attached. Id. at 119-21. Moreover, where
the copying takes place for the specific purpose of making one's goods appear to be
those of another, it would seem that the states should be permitted more discretion
in stopping such predatory business practices than mere labeling laws. See Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. 376 U.S. at 238.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964).
15. In order for a trademark to be registrable on the Principal Register, the
applicant must provide verification that his mark is in use in commerce and that noother person has the right to use it and thereby cause mistake, confusion, or deception.
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a) (1) '(1964). See Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co.,
294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961) ; In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
If the trademark distinguishes applicant's goods from those of others it maybe registrable. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964). Such distinctiveness arises through use by
applicant that causes the public to identify him by the trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(1964). See G. Leblanc Corp. v. H.A. Selmen, Inc., 310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 847 (1950).
16. The owner of a trademark is entitled to the exclusive right to use it. See, e.g.,
In re Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 305 F.2d 492 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 15 U.S.C. § 1065
(1964), provides in pertinent part that:
[T]he right of the registrant to use such registered mark . . .for the goods ...
on . . .which such registered mark has been in continuous use for five consecu-
tive years subsequent to the date of such registration . . . shall be incontestable ....
Thus, not only can use be prohibited, but the registration cannot be challenged after
five years. Moreover, any person who uses or copies a registered trademark in such
[VOL. 16
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Register may be obtained for configurations if they are non-functional,
distinctive and if they possess secondary meaning.17 Moreover, protec-
tion under the Lanham Act may continue indefinitely if the registrant
continues to use the mark.' 8 In Compco, the patent policy of free copying
mandated that the distinctiveness, non-functionality, and secondary mean-
ing of an object could not operate to prohibit copying of unpatented
designs and that the limited duration of protection from copying could
not be extended after the expiration of a patent. Inasmuch as both results
might inure from principal registration under the Lanham Act, it would
appear that, despite its nebulous disclaimer, Compco implicitly suggests that
there is a conflict between federal patent policy and federal trademark law.
Moreover, this conflict would seem to belie the suggestion in Sears that pro-
tection could still be extended to businesses in the use of their trademarks.
The problem is further compounded by a decision rendered by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on the same day as the Sears-
Colupco cases. In the Mogen David Wine19 case, the applicant sought
principal registration for the bottle which contained his product. The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decided that registration could not
be obtained because the bottle was already protected by a design patent.
20
The appellate court reversed, holding that the existence of a design patent
did not, as a matter of law, preclude registration on the Principal
Register. 2 ' Furthermore, it was ruled that use during the existence of
a design patent could amount to trademark use sufficient to entitle the
owner of the design to a trademark.2 2 This holding was based upon the
assumption that patent law existed independently of trademark law and
served different purposes. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated
that it knew "of no provision of patent law, statutory or otherwise, that
a way as to cause confusion, mistake, or deception is liable to the registrant in a
civil action for trademark infringement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-15 (1964).
17. Configurations of goods or containers are considered registrable on the
Principal Register because the following language of section 2(f) is deemed broad
enough to include configurations:
[N]othing in this chapter shall prevent registration of a mark ...which has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce ...
15 U.S.C. § 1051(f) (1964). See In re Duro-Test Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. 137
(T.T.A.B. 1962).
18. Although 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1964), places a twenty year limit upon the time
during which a registration certificate remains in force, the section which follows it
provides that the registration may be renewed for additional periods of twenty years.
15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1964).
19. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), upon R'hing
application denied on factual grounds, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
20. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. 576 (T.T.A.B. 1963), rev'd
on appeal, 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The Board relied upon In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961) and In re Pepsi-Cola Co., 120
U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959), for the proposition that while a container may be
registrable on the Supplemental Register while already protected by a design patent,
it is not registrable on the Principal Register.
21. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928-30 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
22. Id. at 931-32. This ruling was based upon the rationale that Congress had
the power to include the subject matter of design patents used during the life of the
patent as one of the exceptions to the distinctive marks which could be registered
after sufficient trademark use and that the court should not exercise that power in
the face of Congress' failure to do so.
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guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the subject matter of any
expired patent.
'23
It is apparent that the Mogen David court's conception of patent
policy was radically different than that of the Sears-Compco Court. How-
ever, since these cases were decided on the same day, it was left for
developing case law and commentators' analysis to determine whether
a container configuration could be made uncopiable through trademark
registration, despite the absence of patent protection. Accordingly, it is
the initial purpose of this Comment to examine developing trademark
law as it relates to configuration registration. Second, the effect of Sears-
Compco upon trademark registration will be analyzed as well as the status
of the apparent inconsistency between those cases and Mogen David.
Finally, the conflict between patent policy, as stated in Sears-Compco,
and coexistent trademark protection will be examined in order to reach
a conclusion as to whether the existence of a valid, invalid, or expired
design patent on a container configuration should, as a matter of law,
preclude principal trademark registration.
II. HISTORY
A. Early Trademark Law
Under common law and early trademark registration statutes,2 4 the
forms and configurations of packages and containers were not recognized
as trademarks because it was believed that the number of shapes available
for such items was so limited that a grant of trademark protection to the
first appropriators would impose marketing hardships upon late-comers
in the field. 25 Thus, it is apparent that even early trademark theory was
imbued with manifest concern regarding the possible commercial effects
of granting trademark registration.2 6 Moreover, it was considered that
trademark protection of physical objects would result in perpetual monop-
olies of those objects; therefore, the proper means by which to prevent
copiers from using a distinctive shape was deemed to be patent protec-
tion, rather than common law trademark protection or registration under
trademark statutes.27 Consequently, the few registrations of shapes that
23. Id. at 930. On rehearing, it was held that the bottle could not be registered
because, as a factual matter, it could not be said that the design was non-functional
or that secondary meaning had been attached to it. Judge Smith, in a concurring
opinion, responded directly to the Sears-Compco opinions and concluded that the
Court in those cases did not purport to define the boundaries between federal patent
law and federal trademark law. It was Judge Smith's opinion that Sears-Compco
only relates to state unfair competition law. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372
F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
24. See, e.g., 21 Stat. 502 (1881); 33 Stat. 724 (1905) ; 41 Stat. 533 (1920).
25. See, e.g., Harrington v. Libby, 11 F. Cas. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1877); Enoch
Morgan's Sons' Co. v. Troxell, 89 N.Y. 292 (1884) ; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 143 Pa. 623, 22
A. 755 (1891).
26. See Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded By Patent, Trade-
mark, Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product
Simulation Law, 54 T.M.R. 413, 430 (1964).
27. See Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. v. Troxell, 89 N.Y. 292 (1884); Hoyt v.
Hoyt, 143 Pa. 623, 22 A. 755 (1891).
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/4
MARCH 1971]
had been permitted under early statutes were declared invalid.2 8 Further-
more, no registration of articles which were the subjects of expired design
patents was permitted. 29 This denial of trademark recognition for configu-
rations and other indicia not consisting of words was most unreasonable at
a time when widespread use of such marks would have been extremely
useful to illiterate or non-English speaking buyers who might have been
benefited by relying upon product source as a basis for purchasing.
30
B. Unfair Competition Principles
Although granted only meager protection under early trademark law,
the shapes and forms of containers were given some protection under the
principles of unfair competition. Sometime prior to 1618 an unreported
case declared that English Common Law allowed a cause of action against
a defendant who passed off his wares as those of another by use of the
other's trademark.3 ' Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court,
reviewing English and American precedent, concluded that equity should
grant relief in copying cases because one man should not be permitted to
offer his goods as those of another.3 2 Later, in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June
Mfg. Co.,3 3 these broad statements were somewhat restricted. In Singer,
the plaintiff was denied relief from defendant's simulation because the
design patent on his sewing machine had expired and the Court believed
that to grant relief would, in effect, extend the patent monopoly. Hence,
the copying defendant was permitted to use the design of plaintiff's sewing
machine and to use the mark, "Singer." The only limitation on such use
was that the Court required the copier, through labeling, to clearly identify
himself as the source of the product. Subsequent application of Singer
resulted in the "confusion of source" theory of unfair competition law.
Under this theory, a plaintiff's relief from copying was dependent upon
proof not only that the primary significance of the container's shape was
to identify the producer, but also that the imitation was likely to deceive
prospective purchasers with respect to the source of the goods.
8 4
As this theory developed, the federal courts attempted to strike a
balance between the competing concepts of free use of that which is
within the public domain and commercial necessity, which posited that
consumers not be subjected to the liklihood of confusion resulting from
28. Societe Anoyme De La Distillerie v. Puzziello, 250 F. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1918)
(bottle of unique configuration denied registration as a trademark) ; Wilcox & Gibbs
Sewing Machine Co. v. The Gibbons Frame, 17 F. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (registration
of distinctive sewing machine frame reversed).
29. Diaz & Rotert, Principle Registration of Contours of Packages and Con-
tainers Under the Trademark Act of 1946, 49 T.M.R. 13, 16-17 (1959).
30. Abramson, Notes From The Patent Office, 50 T.M.R. 337 (1960).
31. Southern v. Haw, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618).
32. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
33. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
34. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) - James
Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilburn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
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wholesale copying of trademarks.a5 This balance resulted in limited pro-
tection for container designs even under unfair competition principles,
and only on rare occasions did courts utilize such theories to enjoin
copying of distinctive designs. Such protection was even less available
when the copier used his own labels to indicate product source, or where
the container design in issue had, at any time, been protected by a design
patent.3 6 In general, relief was granted only where commercial necessity
required that the product source be identified by reference to the dis-
tinctive container.3
7
Although its application in distinctive design cases has been generally
limited, the commercial necessity theory has occasionally supported in-
junctions against copying a particular form of bottle, even though the
copier used his own identifying labels 38 and the bottle simulated had once
been protected by a design patent.3 9 Clearly then, although not the general
rule, courts have shown concern for the producer's right to market goods
in a distinctive container free from third party interference. 40 How-
ever, since protection from unfair competition is exclusively within state
domain141 and since Sears-Compco declares that state law is powerless to
enjoin such copying, it would appear that any protection for such con-
tainers must be sought at the federal level. 42 The Lanham Act would
seem to be the proper statute under which to seek such protection.
C. Pre Sears-Compco Application of the Lanham Act
Initially, principal registration under the Lanham Act was dependent
upon whether proposed indicia fell within the trademark classifications
35. Compare Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896) and Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) with Lucien Lelong v. George W.
Bulton Corp., 50 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Dubois
Brewing Co., 73 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Pa. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d 370
(3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1949). See also West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955) ;
Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law
of Unfair Competition, 69 DIcK. L. REV. 347 (1965).
36. See Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 F. 939 (2d Cir.
1908) ; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Adler, 154 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1907) ; Enterprise Mfg.
Co. v. Landers, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904) ; Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Simulation
of Rival Goods - The Test of Commercial Necessity, 3 VILL. L. REV. 333 (1957).
37. Such relief was granted only where it could be justified by commercial
necessity and the basic unfairness of defendant's appropriation of another's ideas and
designs. See generally Galbally, supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Tas-T-Nut v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3 (6th Cir. 1957);
Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers Co., 100 F. 809 (7th Cir. 1900).
39. See, e.g., Cook & Bernheimer Co. v. Ross, 73 F. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1896).
40. This concern has been even more manifest in the Ninth Circuit since passage
of the Lanham Act. That circuit sees the statute as a basis for developing federal
unfair competition law. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1952) ; Doran v. Sunset House Distribution Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal.
1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
41. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42. Slavish imitation or "Chinese Copying" has, nevertheless, been permitted in
later unfair competition cases. See, e.g., O'Day Corp. v. Talman Corp., 310 F.2d 623
(1st Cir. 1962) (defendant was permitted to copy plaintiff's boats) ; American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1959) (only unnecessary confusion of
source would justify injunction against copying).
[VOL. 16
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enumerated in section 45 of the Act,43 which limits such indicia to words,
symbols, names or devices. Container configurations are not included in
this list. Since the Act was not deemed to have altered either the early
common law or prior statutory concepts of trademark law,44 shapes and
forms of containers were not considered registrable.
41
However, in the landmark decision of Ex Parte Haig & Haig, Ltd.,46
the applicant was granted registration of his scotch whiskey container on
the Principal Register because it was held to be a symbol or device identi-
fying his goods and distinguishing them from the goods of others.47 The
container had been used as an identifying device for many years, 48 and
there was no other means by which to order the whiskey without describ-
ing the "pinched" contour of the bottle.4 9 Since the contour of the bottle
itself had, in fact, come to indicate a singleness of origin in the minds
of consumers, it was sufficiently distinctive to merit registration. 0 Since
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
44. The limited number of configurations was deemed sufficient reason to deny
registration under early law. See p. 536 supra.
45. See, e.g., Ex parte B.F. Goodrich Co., 98 U.S.P.Q. 197 (Comm'r 1953);
Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Comm'r 1952). See also
Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1950). Although section 23
of the Act permits registration of any configuration possessing secondary meaning,
15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1964), the comprehensive language of that section was considered
limited in its application. However, occasionally it has been interpreted to allow
design patent protection and registration on the Supplemental Register to co-exist.
See, e.g., In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ; In re
Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959); Ex parte Caron Corp., 100
U.S.P.Q. 356 (Comm'r 1954). See also 3 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 974 (3d ed. 1969) ; Wehringer, Two for
One: Trademarks and Design Patents, 50 T.M.R. 1158 (1960). Where the configura-
tion resulted from mechanical processes which were the subject of patent protection,
however, registration on both Principal and Supplemental Registers has been refused.
See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ; West Point Mfg. Co.
v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840
(1955) ; Ex parte United States Plywood Corp., 103 U.S.P.Q. III (Comm'r 1954) ;
Ex parte Jongleux & Lundquist, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q. 77 (Comm'r 1954). Yet, even
if supplemental registration is permitted to co-exist with design patent protection,
such co-existence does not resolve the issue of whether design patent protection and
trademark protection through principal registration conflict because there is no incon-
testability feature with respect to supplemental registration. See Diaz & Rotert,
supra note 29, at 34. Moreover, the main purpose of registration on the Supplemental
Register is to enable the registrant to obtain protection for his design in foreign
countries not affording protection through unfair competition law. See In re Pepsi-
Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468, 469 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
46. 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Cormm'r 1958) [hereinafter referred to as Pinch-Bottle].
47. Id. at 230.
48. As early as 1912, an Illinois court had found that dealers and customers had
come to identify applicant's whiskey by the "pinched decanter." See Diaz & Rotert,
supra note 29, at 27. The mark, "Pinch," had been registered by applicant since 1955
(Reg. No. 608,451).
49. See Diaz & Rotert, supra note 29, at 27.
50. This holding would seem to settle the question whether containers are regis-
trable on the Principal Register and, thus, bring the issue of conflict with patent law
policy into sharp focus. However, the facts involved in Pinch-Bottle were unique
and the only cases leading up to it which might support its conclusion involved
principal registration of slogans. See, e.g., Ex parte Robbins & Myers, Inc., 104
U.S.P.Q. 403 (Comm'r 1955); Ex parte American Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. 476
(Comm'r 1949). Moreover, some commentators contend that Pinch-Bottle was
actually the registration of a slogan, rather than the registration of the container's
configuration. Wehringer, supra note 45, at 1161. The importance placed on the
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registration of contours was not specifically excluded by section 2 of the
Act,5 ' registration was deemed appropriate even though configurations
were not specifically mentioned. This rationale was later applied in the
case of In re Duro-Test Corp.,52 in which it was held that configurations
may be registered on the Principal Register because section 2(f) of the
Act,53 permitting registration of goods distinguished from those of others,
is broad enough to include distinctive configurations. Therefore, it appears
settled that a producer may have a container registered under the Act
if he makes a sufficiently strong showing of distinctiveness.54 Since con-
tainer configurations are registrable on the Principal Register and also
patentable, the question arises whether there is a philosophical difference
between federal patent and trademark law.
III. DESIGN PATENT AND TRADEMARK RATIONALES
A. Design Patent Philosophy
The primary policies behind granting design patent protection are to
promote the decorative arts and to foster inventiveness.55 By offering
patent protection, it is hoped that a creator will be encouraged to experi-
ment and invent as a result of the opportunity to obtain a limited
monopoly in return for his efforts.5 6 It has been argued that this policy
represents a quid pro quo between the creator and the public whereby
the public grants a limited right to exclude copiers for a certain period
of time57 in return for an unlimited right to copy when the exclusionary
right expires.5 8 Obviously, exclusion of copiers after a patent expires
would be repugnant to this theory because such exclusion would defeat
the consideration running to the public. However, it is submitted that
this theory is not properly descriptive of the consideration that actually
runs to the public. The public's right to copy is a common law right of
necessity of using the word "pinch" in order to get the whiskey would tend to support
such a contention. See Derenberg, The Eleventh Year of Administration of The
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 48 T.M.R. 1037, 1045 (1958). Thus, it could be
argued that, even if there is a philosophical conflict between federal trademark and
federal patent law, such conflict is de minimus because of the small number of situa-
tions in which the issue would arise. Such an argument finds support in the case of
In re McIlhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953 (C.C.P.A. 1960), wherein applicant's attempt to
register his capped bottle of pepper sauce failed because it could not be said that the
naked bottle in fact identified and distinguished his goods.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
52. 53 T.M.R. 105 (T.T.A.B. 1963).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
54. See Ex parte E.D. Bullard Co., 115 U.S.P.Q. 11 (Comm'r 1957). But see
In re McIlhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
55. See, e.g., In re Krueger, 208 F.2d 482 (C.C.P.A. 1953) ; Cavu Clothes, Inc.
v. Squires, Inc., 184 F.2d 30, 32 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951).
See Diaz & Rotert, supra note 29, at 30.
56. See Note, 55 T.M.R. 1032, 1033 (1965) ; Diaz & Rotert, supra note 29, at 33.
57. The time period is seventeen years for non-design patents and a maximum
of fourteen years for design patents. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1964).
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longstanding,"9 and patent protection developed as an exception to this
right.60 The power to legislate with respect to this common law excep-
tion was delegated to the federal government under Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution,6 ' but there is no indication that the public, through
the states, also delegated to the federal government the power to other-
wise affect its right to copy.62 It is difficult to see how granting the public
a right which it already has may be consideration for its grant of the
limited exclusionary right. Moreover, the Patent Act6 8 is silent on the
question of a right to copy being granted by the patentee in return for
the limited exclusionary right, 64 and, thus, it would not appear to support
such a quid pro quo theory.
Hence, it cannot be said that patent policy represents a quid pro quo
with the right to copy being the public's consideration. Rather, it would
seem that the actual consideration running to the public, if any, is dis-
closure of the inventor's design idea. Moreover, such a disclosure of
something which is exclusively the creator's property would seem to add
to the public treasure by increasing its store of ideas; whereas, a right to
copy, as consideration, would appear to merely grant the public that which
it already has and, therefore, add nothing to its benefit. Consequently,
the quid pro quo theory positing disclosure of the design idea as the
public's consideration would seem to be the more logical theory. Con-
cededly, exclusion of copiers after patent expiration would not be totally
inconsistent with this theory because the public would not be deprived
of any consideration as a result thereof. However, the danger of frustrat-
ing the congressional intent to limit the exclusionary right 5 still exists
because of the possible indefinite nature of the protection granted through
registration on the Principal Register.66 Hence, it is apparent that patent
protection may conflict with trademark protection, even though the former
is rooted in concepts of the creator's property in his idea and regardless
of whether the right to copy or the inventor's disclosure is considered
the quid pro quo for the patent grant.
59. See Arnold, supra note 26, at 414-17; Chapman, The Supreme Court And
Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 54 T.M.R. 573, 579 (1964). See also Kunin,
The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel Case, 54 T.M.R. 731 (1964).
60. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
62. See Kunin, supra note 59, at 744. Under the theory that the federal govern-
ment was only delegated power to grant an incursion or limitation on the common
law right to copy, it could be argued that state unfair competition law merely repre-
sents a balance between the following two state interests: (1) the interest in protecting
against confusion of source and (2) the interest in free competition or free copying.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1964).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964), states in pertinent part:
Every patent shall contain a . . . grant to the patentee . . . for the term of
seventeen years . . .. of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention. ...
This language seems to support the argument that patent laws do not grant a right
to copy; rather, they merely grant a right to exclude. See generally Arnold, supra
note 26; Chapman, supra note 59.
65. See note 56 supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059 (1964).
COMMENTS
9
Hendershot: Principal Trademark Registration and Patent Policy: An Inherent C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
B. Design Patent Protection Compared With
Trademark Protection
In order for a design to obtain patent protection, it must be new,
original, and ornamental,6 7 and it must show inventiveness.68 The ques-
tion whether a design patent has been infringed normally turns exclusively
upon the similarity of the copy to the original.69 If the copy is so similar
to the subject of the patent that it might be mistaken for the original,
the patentee has an enforceable right to prohibit use by the copier, regard-
less of the fact that no use is made of the design by the patentee. More-
over, the form of use which the copier makes of the design is immaterial
to the patentee's recovery.
70
While design patent protection exists to encourage and protect crea-
tors, inventors, and entreprenuers, 71 the main purpose of trademark
protection is to prevent purchaser confusion as to the source of marketed
goods.72 Since the question whether a design is registrable as a trade-
mark turns upon whether the applicant has used it in such a way and
to such an extent that it has acquired secondary meaning,73 the crucial
inquiry is directed toward the distinctiveness 74 of the configuration. More-
over, trademark rights can be acquired only through actual use of the
configuration as a trademark with respect to specifically enumerated
goods.75 Where a question of trademark infringement arises, the deter-
minative issue is whether the use by a copier is such that it will result
in confusion as to the source of goods with respect to which the trade-
mark has been registered. 76 Thus, from a comparison of the two protec-
tions it is clear that trademark protection differs from design patent
protection in: (1) the basic purposes for which each is available; (2) the
role that actual use plays in the initial grant of protection; and (3) in
the subsequent enforcement against infringement. These basic differences
result in far less extensive protection through trademark recognition than
from patent protection because the former merely prohibits copying of
non-functional features.7 7 In contrast, a patentee is protected against all
copying, no matter what its purpose.78 Furthermore, even if all the fea-
67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1964). See also In re Kreuger, 208 F.2d 482 (C.C.P.A.
1953) ; Cavu Clothes, Inc. v. Squires, Inc., 184 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 920 (1951).
68. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1964). See also In re Walter, 39 F.2d 724 (C.C.P.A.
1930).
69. See, e.g., Gorham Co. v. White, 814 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
70. See Diaz & Rotert, supra note 29, at 33.
71. See p. 540 supra.
72. See Note, supra note 56, at 1033.
73. See notes 11 & 15 supra. See also In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 953
(C.C.P.A. 1955), citing Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 (1893); Ex parte
Mars Signal-Light Co., 85 U.S.P.Q. 173 (Comm'r 1950); Zelnick, Registrations of
Configurations of Goods and Containers in the Light of the Sears and Compco
Decisions, 55 T.M.R. 933 (1965).
74. See note 15 supra.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-15 (1964).
77. See p. 535 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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tures of a design could attain trademark registration, it is questionable
whether an injunction against copying based on secondary meaning would
provide the extensive relief found where an injunction is issued against
infringement of a design patent.79
Even though trademark protection is generally more limited than
patent protection, in certain situations it may be the only effective pro-
tection available to a distinctive container because design patents, like
mechanical patents, are susceptible to frequent attack.80 Moreover, the
identity of a patentee as the producer of a particular product may be
connected to a particular design or feature thereof, and this identification
may survive the expiration or invalidity of a patent because of the dis-
tinctiveness of the design or feature. Under these circumstances, the
surviving distinctive features would not seem to be related to former
patent rights. Therefore, a copier's use of such features might be limited
in the interest of fair competition, even though the interest in free com-
petition embraced by the Sears-Cornpco theory of patent policy would
seem to dictate that no limitation be placed on such copying.81 Thus, the
existence of basic differences in the two forms of protection82 and the
existence of extraordinary situations in which one form of protection,
being more desirable, could be attained without doing violence to the
other,8  would seem to support the conclusion that federal patent policy
and federal trademark law do not conflict.
C. Dysfunctional Effects of the Conflict
Although the foregoing rationale might suggest that patent and
trademark law do not conflict, there are, nevertheless, more persuasive
arguments which compel the conclusion that the two necessarily conflict,
In the first place, to allow trademark registration subsequent to the termi-
nation of patent protection would, in practical effect, expand the time
limit placed on the patent monopoly.8 4 Moreover, to permit subsequent
registration of a container would effectively make design patent protection
a form of supplemental registration through which secondary meaning
79. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1949) (equity decrees are always open to modification if circumstances change).
80. This is indicated by the fact that sixty-one percent of the patents granted
between 1948 and 1954 were subsequently held invalid by appellate courts. Hearings
on S. Res. 92 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 178 (1955).
81. See 1 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 390 (4th ed. 1947).
82. See p. 542 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
84. There is considerable authority to the effect that trademark usage cannot be
utilized to expand the limited duration of design patent protection. See, e.g., North
British Rubber Co. v. Racine Rubber Tire Co., 271 F. 936 (2d Cir. 1921) ; Rowley v.
Tresenberg, 37 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1941); New England Lace Mills, Inc. v. American Textile Co., 42 U.S.P.Q. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Whistle Co. of America, 20 F.2d 955,
957 (D. Del. 1927), in which it was stated in dictum that even where product con-
fusion resulted from use of the same container by two different parties, a design patent
infringement would not be found because product confusion could not be used to
expand the time limit for the patent monopoly.
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could be developed without third party interference. Thus, although it
can be argued that precluding the copying of a container does not inhibit
free competition in the product and, therefore, permitting trademark
registration presents no conflict with free competition theories which
demand free copying;85 it is clear that the necessary effect of two pro-
tections for the container will be the patentee's exclusion of design
competitors for a period sufficient to establish the requisite secondary
meaning in the container contour and thus, obtain trademark registration
under which he may exclude copiers for an indefinite period after the
patent expires. Consequently, the limited time during which the patentee,
by virtue of his patent, may exclude others from use of his design is
extended, and secondary meaning is permitted to attach while the owner
is completely insulated from competitive use by others.8 6 It is clear that
the drafters of the Patent Act intended the patentee's right to exclude
others to be limited.8 7 Since co-existent protections for an entrepreneur's
design permits the limited duration of the patent monopoly to be extended,
it would appear that the conclusion that patent law and trademark law
conflict is inescapable. In light of the foregoing, an important inquiry
would seem to be whether concern with this conflict has been a major
consideration in trademark cases subsequent to Sears-Compco.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE Sears-Compco RATIONALE IN
SUBSEQUENT TRADEMARK CASES.
In Piel Manufacturing Co. v. George A. Rolfes Co.,88 plaintiff sought
relief from defendant's simulation of his design on grounds that such
copying infringed his trademark "curry-trol." It was suggested by the
court that not only is the doctrine of secondary meaning of little signifi-
cance after Sears-Compco,89 but that, where relief is sought on the basis
of trademark infringement and the infringement allegations center mainly
upon the act of copying a design rather than upon the act of copying
another form of mark, trademark law conflicts with the patent and copy-
right clause9 ° of the Constitution.9 ' However, since the trademark in-
volved in that case was a word rather than a design, the issue of whether
85. See Arnold, supra note 26, at 433.
86. Moreover, there may be instances in which the container is such that the
only use of it that could be made is that which is made by the patentee. Under such
circumstances, it is even clearer that exclusive use by him after expiration of the
patent extends the patent monopoly. Not even the use of additional labels by a com-
petitor would afford him a reasonable opportunity to make use of the configuration
because they may make his product unsaleable. See, e.g., Frankfort Distilleries v.
Kasko Distillers Prod. Corp., 111 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1940). Thus, it would appear
that, even if secondary meaning was not developed until after patent expiration, the
two protections would, nevertheless, conflict.
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1964). The patentee's ability to exclude competitors
from his invention shall exist for not more than seventeen years or, if there is a
design patent, fourteen years.
88. 233 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Iowa 1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1966).
89. Id. at 896.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
91. 233 F. Supp. at 898.
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such a conflict exists was not squarely before the court; thus, leaving it
free to rule that the mark "curry-trol" was too descriptive of the product
and therefore, not a valid trademark.
92
Although Piel recognized the problem posed by the conflict, it left
the question unresolved. This strongly suggests that Mogen David93 is
still in force. Moreover, while the bottle design involved in Mogen David
was eventually denied registration on the Principal Register, the court's
ruling that the existence of a design patent on the same object did not
preclude registration was not overturned. Rather, the denial of registra-
tion was based upon a finding that the bottle was not, in fact, a trade-
mark.94 Judge Smith, in his concurring opinion, stated that the original
decision on the law remained intact and that, since the Court in Sears-
Compco did not purport to define the interrelationships between federal
patent law and federal trademark law, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals remained free to rule that a design was registrable, even though
such design was the subject of a design patent.95 Thus, in the aftermath
of Mogen David, containers were considered registrable, but there was no
indication of the extent to which such registration would be permitted.
In some early dispositions the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
took the position that the Sears-Cornpco cases dealt only with pre-emption
of state unfair competition law and that they did not deal with matter
registrable under the Lanham Act.96 This attempt to distinguish Sears-
Compco was followed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
In re Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,97 which broadened the
scope of registrability to the extent that the entire outer-contour of a
product was held registrable on both the Supplemental and Principal
Registers provided such contour was arbitrary, non-functional, and capable
of showing origin.98 A federal district court in Kentucky has also adopted
this position and held a spiral spot pattern on a sash cord to be a distinc-
tive trademark having secondary meaning and hence, within the scope
of trademark law.99 The court, distinguishing between trade dress simu-
lation and product simulation, held the former impermissible while view-
ing the Sears-Compco rule as limited to the latter. 00 Under this rationale,
the distinctive design of a container configuration could be registered as
trade dress and simulation thereof would be prohibited as dress simula-
92. Id. at 899. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
93. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See pp.
535-36 supra.
94. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967). See
note 20 supra.
95. 372 F.2d at 543 (Smith, J., concurring).
96. See, e.g., Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 143
U.S.P.Q. 163 (T.T.A.B. 1964), aff'd, 405 F.2d 901 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
97. 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
98 Id. at 839-40.
99. Sampson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 145 U.S.P.Q. 602 (W.D.
Ky. 1964). See also Amco Engineering Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. 609
(E.D. Ohio 1965).
100. In this context, trade dress refers to that which functions only to enhance the
appearance of a product and is not related to the product itself.
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tion. The broad scope of these trademark cases' 0 ' would appear to permit
widespread registration of container configurations. 10 2 Should such a
trend go unharnessed, the public would be adversely affected by the poten-
tial increase in trademark registration especially since an applicant's sub-
jective and self-serving statements may be the basis for finding a container
distinctive enough to be entitled to principal registration. 10 3 The ultimate
result could well be that almost any outer contour would be considered
a trademark and that the concept of a "mark" would become diluted and
thus, no longer supportive of the theory that secondary meaning presup-
poses something so distinctive that any copying thereof would be done
ipso facto for purposes of representing one's goods as those of another.
10 4
Fortunately, this trend has not gone completely unchecked. Rather,
some cases have taken a restrictive view of the non-functionality require-
ment and denied registration. The landmark case adopting such a posi-
tion is In re Deister Concentrator Co.,10 5 in which the rhomboidal shape
of the desk on an ore-shaking table was denied registration on grounds
that it was a functional shape and that public policy against monopolizing
functional shapes mandated rejection of the application. 06 The leading
post Sears-Compco case relying upon Deister is In re Shenango Ceramics,
Inc. 017 In Shenango the under-ribbing of applicant's china was denied
registration because it was deemed too functional to be a trademark. The
majority distinguished Mogen David on grounds that, although the un-
patented container design involved in that case might be registrable, such
registration differed from the application for registration of a functional
and utilitarian product shape in that the bottle design in Mogen David
appeared to be wholly arbitrary and non-functional.10 8 This propensity
101. A more recent case has gone so far as to hold that buildings are registrable
as design marks. See In re Griffs of America, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. 592 (T.T.A.B.
1968). Furthermore, it has been ruled that the ornamental nature of a design does not
preclude it from becoming a valid mark capable of distinguishment. See In re
Gingher Mfg. Co., Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 475 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
102. This trend marks a fundamental departure from the more conservative posi-
tion taken by patent office tribunals. See, e.g., American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman,
275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) ; Speedry Prods., Inc. v.
Dr. Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1964), provides that the applicant shall supply the
necessary verification with regard to the mark's use. Thus, trademark recognition
is dependent upon information supplied by the owner which could well be self-serving.
104. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964)
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also Smith, supra note 58.
105. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
106. Judge Rich attempted to draw a distinction between cases involving merely
aesthetic features which are so arbitrary that no harm would result from monopoliza-
tion and the Deister case involving features which are functional enough that some
harm would result. 289 F.2d at 504-06. However, this distinction would seem to be
an insufficient answer to the inherent conflict with patent law extant in the Mogen
David and Pinch-Bottle cases since patent law fails to make the same distinctions
between aesthetic and functional designs. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1958).
107. 362 F.2d 287 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
108. Id. at 292. In the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decision, a concurring
member argued that product shapes should be unregistrable as a matter of law, regard-
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toward construing registrability as a factual question turning upon whether
the contour was functional, arbitrary, or distinctive and whether secondary
meaning had been acquired has been followed in the recent case of In re
Tri-X-Corp.,10 9 in which principal registration was denied on grounds
that the configuration involved did not primarily indicate origin, but
rather indicated that its prime purpose was functional." 0
It is apparent that trademark tribunals have been reluctant to over-
turn earlier statements that configurations are not per se unregistrable. in
By denying registration on factual grounds, they have avoided the issue
of whether patent protection precludes trademark registration. Thus, it
can be concluded that the statement of patent policy promulgated in Sears-
Cornpco has not caused a significant upheaval in trademark law. The
failure to confront these issues is most unfortunate because the continu-
ing opportunity for protection through registration on the Principal
Register where a design patent has not yet been obtained, could induce
entrepreneurs, faced with the increased possibility of securing no protec-
tion under state unfair competition laws, to indiscriminately seek federal
trademark registration." 2  The potential increase in applications could
cause the dilution of secondary meaning concepts. Such a dilution would
decrease the value of trademarks as indicators of product source." 3 It is
clear that this unfortunate result would not only frustrate the very pur-
pose for granting trademark protection, 11 4 but also would exacerbate the
conflict between patent policy and trademark law. Under these circum-
stances, the question arises whether these factors, along with elements
relating to the public good, mandate a conclusion that container designs
which have been the subject of valid, invalid, or expired design patents
should be denied trademark protection as a matter of law.
V. SHOULD PATENT PROTECTION PRECLUDE
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION?
Even though trademark tribunals have been reluctant to declare that
unpatented container configurations are unprotectible through trademark
registration," 5 it is submitted that, since the necessary effect of co-existent
protection is extension of the patent monopoly," 0 only an overriding con-
sumer interest in preserving the possibility of a container obtaining both
protections would justify a conclusion that patent policy should not
109. 154 U.S.P.Q. 379 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
110. Apparently, a greater showing of distinctiveness would have caused registra-
tion to be allowed. See also In re G. Leblanc Corp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 603 (T.T.A.B.
1967) ; In re Chas. 0. Larson Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 750 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
111. See pp. 545-47 supra.
112. U.S. TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, YEAR END REPORT (1964) indicates that,
during 1964, a record number of trademark applications were made, and a record
number were allowed. See also Denenberg, The Eighteenth Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 55 T.M.R. 609 (1965).
113. See p. 542 supra.
114. Id.
115. See pp. 545-47 supra.
116, See pp. 543-44 supra.
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preclude principal trademark registration when the configuration in issue
has been granted a design patent. Despite their distaste for unscrupulous
simulation by a competitor, courts have long recognized that, in general,
greater consumer interests are served if free copying is permitted and
free competition preserved. 1 7 Permitting such free competition in con-
tainer designs which are not protected by existing patents would prevent
producers from charging a premium price based upon new designs which
draw buyers merely because they are attractive." 8 In addition, the
producer will shoulder the burden of convincing prospective purchasers
that his product, without more, is of such a quality that it should be
purchased at the price for which it is available.119 The desirable result
of such a policy is that competition will be focused upon actual product
quality thus, minimizing the subtle effects that unique container configura-
tions can have on consumer choice. 120 On the other hand, it should be
acknowledged that product differentiation is essential to free competition,
and it would seem that distinction among competitors is necessary for
such differentiation. Therefore, it may be argued that container designs
which become the means by which consumers distinguish between com-
petitors should be protected in order that product differentiation be pre-
served. 12 ' However, the use of adequate labels or non-contour trademarks
would suffice to insure that the public is able to distinguish one competitor
from another. Therefore, to the extent that competitor identity is neces-
sary in product differentiation, such can be accomplished without granting
originators of unpatented container designs the right to indefinately ex-
clude copiers through registration as principal register trademarks.
22
Moreover, nothing bars the owner of the configuration from seeking a
patent. In short, the arguments against free copying of container designs
are not persuasive, and it would appear that the greater public good
created through free competition would be best assured by uniformly
adhering to the policy of free copying announced in Sears-Compco.
Furthermore, such a result is consistent with the intent of the founders
of trademark law who were concerned with protecting the public from
117. See, e.g., Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H.G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614 (2d
Cir. 1962) ; See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596, 600
(7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961) ; American Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959);
Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269
(7th Cir. 1943). See generally Marks, Copying an Article of Commerce Not Neces-
sarily Unfair Competition, 55 T.M.R. 47 (1965).
118. See generally Urey, Product Simulation - Before and After The Stiffel Case,
55 T.M.R. 947 (1965).
119. Id. at 959.
120. See generally V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
121. See Treece, Copying Methods of Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair
Competition?, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 244, 247 (1963).
122. Although it could be argued that such a rule overlooks the possibility of
post-sale confusion as to source caused when labels or non-contour trademarks are
removed or obliterated, it appears to be well settled that the principles protecting
against confusion as to source seek to do so at the time of sale, not later. See Urey,
supra note 117, at 959-60.
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dubious commercial practices. 123 Since co-existing protections can result
in the deceptive business practice of attracting buyers by reference to
mere container attractiveness or producer identity, rather than by refer-
ence to product quality, it is submitted that the benefit which results to
the public from a policy of free copying mandates a conclusion that con-
tainer contours should be unregistrable as a matter of law, regardless of
the degree of distinctiveness they have acquired. Moreover, there is some
indication that such a per se rule of unregistrability has been considered
by some tribunals.
The only case that has squarely confronted the inherent conflict
between registration on the Principal Register and patent protection is
In re International Playtex Corp.12 4 In this case, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board ruled that the petitioner's cylindrical girdle container
could not be registered on the Principal Register, despite proof that
de facto secondary meaning had been established. The Board reasoned
that, since such common forms are available to manufacturers generally
and since the public has a right to copy them in the absence of a patent,
it should not vest the exclusive right to use them in any one producer.
125
In so ruling the court relied upon In re Pollak Steel Co.,' 26 in which it
was stated that the policy denying registration to that which the public
has a right to copy in the absence of patent protection is a fundamental
principle of the law of trademark ownership which transcends the pro-
visions of the Lanham Act. 27 Under this rationale, the provisions of
the Act permitting registration of distinctive container designs128 would
be subservient to a more fundamental principle, and no amount of dis-
tinctiveness or secondary meaning would suffice to permit registration.
129
It is submitted that proper application of patent policy, as stated in Sears-
Cornpco, requires widespread application of the Playtex-Pollak rationale
with the result that principal trademark registration for container designs
be denied as a matter of law.
It may be argued that adoption of such a per se rule of unregistra-
bility for container configurations might put trademark tribunals in a
123. Trademark law has its roots in basic commercial concepts. See Arnold, supra
note 26, at 430. Some have seen the Lanham Act as creating federal jurisdiction over
a branch of unfair competition law. Smith, supra note 58. Moreover, in James
Heddons' Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1942), it is stated that:
It is . . . fundamental . . . that one man has no right . . . to use . . . indicia by
which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling
are the manufacture of another....
Thus, it is apparent that a primary concern of the Lanham Act is predatory busi-
ness practices.
124. 155 U.S.P.Q. 745 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
125. Id. at 746-47. Member Lefkowitz dissented, arguing that registrability was
a factual matter and that the container should not have been precluded from regis-
tration as a matter of law. Id. at 747.
126. 314 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
127. Id. at 567.
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1964).
129. See also Tappan Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1967);
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quandary with respect to container contours already registered on the
Principal Register. However, notwithstanding infringement actions, the
problem would be de mininus since when renewal is sought the Board
could deny it in deference to the fundamental principle that the public
has a right to freely copy unpatented designs. Moreover, even in an action
for infringement application of the per se rule of unregistrability would
not seem to present an insurmountable problem. It is submitted that
courts would have two alternatives in such a situation. First, the rule
of unregistrability could be applied retroactively thus, rendering the trade-
mark invalid. However, such retroactive application may be deemed un-
duly harsh on the owners of contour marks. This harshness could be
avoided while still maintaining appropriate application of the rule by
placing the burden upon the owner of the mark to show both continued
secondary meaning and indistinguishable use by a competitor. The result
of this second approach would be to deny the presumptive validity of
the mark. 80 Thus, the court would be free to rule the mark invalid,
while at the same time the owner thereof would have an opportunity to
continue his protection for the full length of the initial grant. It seems
clear, therefore, that the door left open by the Mogen David approach
should be closed and that container contours should be exclusively pro-
tected by patents.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though there are strong arguments supporting the propositions
that: (1) patent policy does not include a right to copy; and (2) patent
protection and trademark protection have different bases and applications,
they are not conclusive as to whether there is an inherent conflict between
the two. Rather, the fact that the necessary practical effect of granting
trademark protection in the presence of a valid, invalid, or expired patent
is to extend the limited duration of the patent law exclusionary right
requires a conclusion that there is an inherent conflict between the two
branches of law. Although this conflict, to date, has had only minimal
effect in the area of principal trademark registration, there have been
some indications that it may result in a rule that container designs are
per se unregistrable. If such a rule should emerge, even fewer contours
will be protected than have been in the past. It is submitted that this
would be the preferable approach because: (1) the possibility of vastly
increased registrations and the attendant dilution of the "mark" concept1 s '
will be avoided; and (2) the greater public good resulting from a policy
of free copying'8 2, will be more effectively realized.
Thomas R. Hendershot
130. See, e.g., Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mo. 1964),
which was an infringement action wherein the owner of the Principal Register mark,
"flourentine," for chessmen was required to show that it had a continued secondary
meaning. He failed to do so, and the mark was declared invalid; as a result,
defendant's copying was permitted, even though his chessmen were indistinguishable
and even though the plaintiff was admittedly the first to use the design and mark.
131. See p. 547 supra.
132. See pp. 547-49 supra.
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